The Northern Triangle’s drugs-violence nexus
Since the start of Mexican president Felipe Calderón's military crackdown on drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in 2006, Mexico has occupied the limelight when it comes to media attention focusing on drugrelated violence in Latin America. However, while this 'Mexican focus' continues to be prevalent, it is actually Central America's Northern Triangle1 – consisting of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – which is currently experiencing much higher rates of violence and increasing DTO activity, thus providing an illustration of the 'balloon effect' previously experienced by Mexico itself after the implementation of Plan Colombia which was conceived at the end of the 90's.
Together, the countries of the Northern Triangle now form one of the most violent regions on earth. Both El Salvador and Guatemala have been experiencing murder rates higher than those recorded during the countries' civil wars. But it is Honduras – though having been spared the kind of bloody civil wars as experienced by its neighbours – which currently occupies first place on worldwide homicide rate rankings.
Although it is clear that the violence in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala is pervasive and able to destabilize these Central American societies to a large extent, no consensus seems to exist on its exact causes. As in Mexico, much of the violence is attributed to the increased role of Central America as a transit region for controlled drugs destined for the US. While this is to a certain extent justifiable, the possibility of involvement in the drug trade as a symptom of underlying socialeconomic issues rather than a prime cause of violence and crime in itself should certainly not be overlooked.
Another issue often mentioned is the existence of large gangs, or maras, in the region, which foster a culture of machismo Introduction and criminal behaviour and have thereby contributed significantly to the high levels of criminal violence.For this problem underlying causes can of course be identified as well, but it should also be noted that the involvement of maras in drug trafficking operations is reportedly growing, taking the form of both collaboration as well as competition with DTOs.
One of the most important factors contributing significantly to rising crime levels is, paradoxically, the infamous mano dura (iron fist) responses to crime on the part of the region’s governmental authorities, showing that the ‘cure’ might very well be worse than the disease it is meant to treat. Again, this situation can be compared to that of Mexico where the militarization strategy against DTOs has been accompanied by a severe escalation of violence in the country.
This paper will first address the particulars of the high levels of criminal violence in the Northern Triangle. Then an attempt will be made to map out the extent to which the drug trade in general, and in particular the involvement of Mexican DTOs and their part in the region’s criminal violence, are important factors in each of the countries of the region. We will then explore the recently reinvigorated debate on alternative approaches to drug control strategies in the Americas.
In spite of the similarities of the challenges posed to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras when it comes to drug-related problems and criminal violence, the positions occupied by the political leaders of these countries in this incipient debate differ considerably. Further sections of this paper will go into the drug legislation of these countries, as well as the main drug control strategies they have been following to determine how the differences in rhetoric matches actual policies. Then, because of the US opposition to alternative approaches to the war on drugs, important co-operation frameworks between the US and countries in the Northern Triangle will briefly be described in order to assess US leverage in promoting its preferred drug control strategies in this region.
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